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ABSTRACT
Due to the rising privacy demand in data mining, Homomorphic
Encryption (HE) is receiving more and more attention recently for
its capability to do computations over the encrypted field. By using
the HE technique, it is possible to securely outsource model learn-
ing to the not fully trustful but powerful public cloud computing
environments. However, HE-based training scales badly because
of the high computation complexity. It is still an open problem
whether it is possible to apply HE to large-scale problems. In this
paper, we propose a novel general distributed HE-based data min-
ing framework towards one step of solving the scaling problem.
The main idea of our approach is to use the slightly more communi-
cation overhead in exchange of shallower computational circuit in
HE, so as to reduce the overall complexity. We verify the efficiency
and effectiveness of our new framework by testing over various
data mining algorithms and benchmark data-sets. For example, we
successfully train a logistic regression model to recognize the digit
3 and 8 within around 5 minutes, while a centralized counterpart
needs almost 2 hours.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Cryptography; Software and appli-
cation security; Domain-specific security and privacy archi-
tectures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed a surge of revolutionary break-
throughs in high technology, accompanied with an avalanche of
the large-scale data in many fields. In industry, the data is no longer
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hosted on a single server or cluster and more computational re-
sources are required to analyze these data. The cloud computing
and distributed machine learning techniques have emerged to be
the ideal solutions for big and cost-effective data storage and anal-
ysis. However, at the same time, it has also raised security and
privacy concerns for using sensitive user data in public cloud com-
puting, especially in the financial and medical fields. As a result,
states across the world enact laws to protect the privacy of user
data. For example, the famous General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) [32] passed by European Union in 2018 sets up strict
rules for companies to use personal data. Traditional encryption
techniques mainly address the security and privacy issues in the
data storage and transfer tasks, but not the data analysis task. This
poses great challenges to the machine learning and data mining re-
searchers, i.e. how can we securely learn the machine learning and
data mining models in the public cloud computing and distributed
machine learning environments, which may not be fully trustful.
Existing approaches proposed can be roughly divided into four
main categories, i.e. Differential Privacy (DP) [16, 17], Secure Multi-
Party Computation (MPC) [36], Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [19,
34] and secure Enclave [10, 29]. Every approach has its advantages
and drawbacks:
• Differential privacy (DP) has strong theoretical guaran-
tees to preserve privacy but leads to performance degrada-
tion which is not acceptable in many cases, what’s more,
privacy parameters choice in DP such as ϵ is still a mystery;
• Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) enables multi-
ple parties to securely evaluate a function without revealing
their own input, but it heavily relies on communication and
is usually not trivial to formulate a model under MPC frame-
work;
• Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is well known for its abil-
ity to do computations in the encrypted field, but it has
notoriously high computation overhead;
• Secure Enclave outsources the model training to a trusted
third party. Obviously, its security guarantee is totally re-
lied on the design of this third party system. There have
been many attacks targeted at such kind of systems like the
famous side channel attack.
To sum up, it is still challenging to deploy a large-scale secure data
mining system based on the current status of these techniques. In
this paper, we want to take one step further to the building of a
practical secure data mining system by focusing on decreasing the
time complexity of the HE based data mining systems.
More precisely, we propose a novel distributed secure data min-
ing framework which achieves fast model learning over Homo-
morphic Encryption. The design of our framework is based on
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identifying a key feature of the Homomorphic Encryption: HE actu-
ally performs approximate computation and the noise accumulated
in the ciphertext after each operation. Naturally, plaintext can not
be correctly recovered if the noise grows too much. As a result, a
technique called bootstrap has been invented by the cryptographic
researchers to control the noise. However, bootstrap is a major
source of time complexity. It is both extremely expensive (at least
10× slower compared to other basic operations) and leads to higher
complexity of other operations. Naturally, we can save a lot of
computation if the bootstrap is not performed. In this paper, we
will show that this is possible for data mining models especially
under the distributed learning scenario. Actually, data mining mod-
els are relatively insensitive to the noise. As shown by Zhu et al.
[37], it is possible to compress the model parameters as low as 1
bit without losing much performance. More importantly, the depth
of the computational circuit in distributed learning is bounded as
the worker will refresh its parameter every a few iterations. Our
framework is based on this simple observation and we will show
later in the experimental section that our framework achieves at
least 10× times of training speed boost while keeping the same
model performance. As a simple example, our framework trains
a logistic regression model over MNIST data-set to the accuracy
of 96.5% within around 5 minutes in contrast with nearly 2 hours
training time of a traditional HE based learning framework. Finally,
note that our system protects the data privacy in that the worker
has access only to the encrypted data and have no idea about the
original data.
Contribution.We summarize the main contributions of this paper
as follows:
• Wedemonstrate the possibility of doing bootstrap-free homo-
morphic encryption based data mining under the distributed
machine learning setting for the first time;
• We show our new secure data mining framework can achieve
at least 10× training time saving compared to the centralized
HE-based data mining system while maintaining the same
model prediction performance.
Organization. The remaining part of this paper is organized as
follows: In Section 2, we introduce the related work, especially the
recent development of homomorphic encryption and its application
to the datamining; In Section 3, we present some preliminary results
as the basis of our framework; In Section 4, we formally introduce
our framework and give a practical algorithm that can be used for
training; In Section 5, we present the experimental results and make
discussions; In Section 6, we summarize this paper and discuss the
future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
HE supports arithmetic computation over the encrypted field. ‘ Ho-
momorphic ’ here means that the encryption function and decryp-
tion function are homomorphism between plaintext and ciphertext.
More precisely, suppose zi denotes the plaintext, si denotes the
ciphertext and π and π−1 denote the encryption and decryption
function respectively. If we have:
s1 = π (z1)
s2 = π (z2) (1)
and:
z0 = z1 ⊗ z2
s0 = s1 ⊗˜ s2 (2)
Then we have s0 = π (z0). ⊗ denote any arithmetic computation e.g.
addition and multiplication, while ⊗˜ denotes the encrypted version
of the corresponding computation.
HE, which is viewed as the Holy Grail of cryptography [33],
dates back to the 70s when RSA technique was proposed. Different
types of HE schemas are proposed since then. Paillier [31] proposes
a framework that only supports homomorphic addition. Frame-
works like Paillier’s which only support certain HE operations are
referred as partially HE later, while more powerful frameworks
like [3] which support both addition and multiplication are called
somewhat (leveled) HE. They are not fully-HE framework as they
constrain the maximum depth of the computational circuit. The
first real fully-HE (FHE) framework which supports the evaluation
of arbitrary computational circuit is proposed by Gentry [19] in
2009. A key innovation of this framework is the use of bootstrap
technique to control the noise of the ciphertext. Actually, the core
idea of bootstrap is just to re-encrypt the ciphertext but in a homo-
morphic way, i.e. Define a computational circuit in the encryption
field that is homomorphic to the operation of decryption and en-
cryption and then evaluate this circuit. The initial design proposed
by Gentry [19] is extremely slow (several orders slower than other
basic homomorphic operations such as addition and multiplication).
An important research topic [4, 5, 34] afterwards is to improve
the practicability of the fully HE proposed by Gentry [19]. A good
review of the recent development of HE can be found in Challa
[9]. Specially, our framework is built upon a recently proposed
FHE framework named Homomorphic Encryption for Arithmetic
of Approximate Numbers (HEAAN). This framework has two main
features. Firstly, it supports homomorphic rounding operation. As
a result, the magnitude of the ciphertext modulus is linear with
respect to the depth of the computational circuit in contrast to
the exponential relation in other FHE frameworks. Moreover, the
rounding operation is particularly suitable for machine learning
applications, where the precision of the model parameters is of
less concern. The second feature of this framework is that it sup-
ports the packing operation, where one ciphertext can encode a
set of plaintext (parameters). As a result, operation on ciphertext is
equivalent to doing parallel computation for the plaintext, which
improves the training speed.
We now briefly overview the recent development of HE-based
data mining, which can be looked from multiple angles: From the
perspective of HE frameworks, partial HE frameworks [31] are
widely used in early days for their simplicity, however, their ap-
plications are greatly restricted due to limited capabilities, e.g.,
applications based on the paillier framework [31] need to avoid
encrypted multiplication by careful algorithmic design [11, 23]. In
the era of FHE, it is possible to train arbitrary model completely
over the encrypted data in theory [8, 15], however, the complexity
becomes the major bottleneck and prevents the full exploitation of
FHE’s ability; From the perspective of data mining models, most
previous research focuses on shallowmodels, e.g. logistic regression
[1, 2, 8, 13, 15], decision tree [11] and clustering [14, 24]. As for the
recent popularized deep models, there is effort on making inference
over the private data [6, 20, 26], but not much on training. The
major difficulty comes from the high complexity. On the one hand,
the computation circuit of the gradient evaluation is much deeper
compared to that of the shallow models, on the other hand, deep
models typically need more iterations to converge. The two factors
combined together make it impractical to train a deep model over
the current HE system. Finally, there is also effort trying to make
adaptions between the HE framework and the data mining models
to make them more suitable for the other. In the HE side, Jiang
et al. [25], Mishra et al. [30] propose fast matrix-vector multipli-
cation kernels for the acceleration of HE-based data mining, and
Crawford et al. [15] makes customized optimization for frequently
used homomorphic operations by data mining like comparisons
and inversion. In the model side, there are two main directions.
One is to reduce the depth of computational circuit, e.g. Cheon
et al. [13] proposes to use ensemble methods so that each model
can converge within less iterations and as a result, to reduce the
circuit depth. The other is to linearize the machine learning models
using methods like Taylor expansion or regression [2, 22] so as
to alleviate the lack of efficient non-linear operations in most HE
frameworks.
3 PRELIMINARY
In this section, we briefly introduce some results that our frame-
work is built upon. Firstly we introduce the Fully-HE framework
HEAAN, which is composed of three main components, i.e. en-
code/decode, encrypt/decrypt and basic homomorphic operations
(addition, multiplication et. al.). We briefly review them as follows
(refer to Cheon et al. [12] for more detailed description of each
component):
• Encode/Decode process transforms the plaintext, a vector
in RN , to/from a polynomial in the Nth order cyclotomic
polynomial ring (equivalently, the coefficients-vector of the
polynomial) by the Canonical Embedding technique;
• Encrypt/Decrypt process transforms the plaintext to/from
ciphertext which both are a cyclotomic polynomial. The
public key and private key are needed in this process and
are also cyclotomic polynomials. The security of this process
is guaranteed by the hardness of Ring Learning-with-Errors
(R-LWE) problem;
• Homomorphic operations supported by the framework
are addition, multiplication, bootstrap and scaling operation.
Bootstrap is for refreshing the noisy ciphertext and scaling
performs homomorphic rounding operation so as to keep the
modulus of the ciphertext linear with respect to the depth
of the computational circuit.
We alsomention two important complexity parameters of the frame-
work. One is the order N of the cyclotomic polynomial ring, which
decides the number of plaintext we can pack into one ciphertext.
The other is the magnitude M of the ciphertext modulus which
controls the complexity of basic homomorphic operations. Roughly
speaking, we want to maximize N and minimize M to accelerate
the computation, but M and N are positively correlated, so there is
a trade-off between the two.
In [22], the authors train a logistic regression model based on
HEAAN. In this paper, [22] is referred as the centralized HE learner
and will be used as the baseline for comparison. We briefly mention
two useful tricks proposed by Han et al. [22]. Firstly, the authors
design a customized data packing schema for logistic regression.
More specifically, suppose we have a N by D data matrix X , where
N is the number of samples and D denotes the sample dimension.
Then to encrypt X , we divide it into l × h small blocks and encrypt
each block with one ciphertext. The parameter vector is grouped
and encrypted using the similar way. As mentioned in [22], the
proposed packing method outperforms other more straightforward
ways, e.g. packing by rows or columns, in terms of the training
speed. Next, the authors propose to use regression to linearize the
nonlinear functions such as the Sigmoid function which contrasts
with the usual Taylor expansion approach. The authors show the
regression outperforms the Taylor expansion way. The regression
way works as follows: suppose we want to fit a nonlinear function
f (x) withMth order polynomial p(x) =
∑M
i=1 αix
i , then we solve
the following high-order least square problem:
min
α ∈RM
N∑
j=1
1
2 (f (x j ) − p(x j ))
2 (3)
where {x j }j ∈[N ] are randomly sampled. In this paper, we follow
this idea to approximate other nonlinear activation functions such
as the hinge loss function used in the SVM algorithm.
4 FRAMEWORK DESIGN AND ALGORITHM
IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we introduce our framework which enables faster
secure data mining via distributed homomorphic encryption. The
structure of our framework is shown in Figure 1. We use the worker
and parameter-server model for the distributed training. In our
framework, we assume the parameter server is honest and hold
the private key for encryption and decryption, while the workers
perform the training jobs in a privacy preserving fashion, i.e. the
workers just have access to the encrypted data and the encrypted
model parameters. More precisely, the framework includes two
phases: the initialization phase and the training phase as shown
in Figure 1. In the initialization phase, the parameter server first
generates the public and secret key pair and encrypts the data using
the generated keys. Then it partitions the data and distributes the
data to the correspondingworker. In the training phase, eachworker
performs training over the encrypted data until that the noise of the
encrypted parameter reaches some predefined threshold, then the
worker will send the encrypted parameter back to the parameter
server and request update. In the parameter server side, it waits for
the request of the worker. When it receives an update request, the
parameter server decrypts the parameter and makes update to its
own copy of the parameter, then it will send the encrypted version
of the new parameter back to the worker.
Note that our framework is agnostic with specific HE frame-
works, data mining models or distributed learning frameworks.
Our framework can boost the training speed tremendously as long
as the bootstrap operation is the bottleneck of the application. But
for the sake of demonstration, we consider the case of learning a
linear model based on the HEAAN framework in a synchronous
…...
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Figure 1: Two phases of our Training Framework. Left Figure shows initialization phase, and right figure shows the training
phase.
fashion. More specifically, we study the following linear model:
min
ω ∈Ω⊂Rd
f (ω)
= min
ω ∈Ω⊂Rd
n∑
i=1
L(yi × f (xi )) + R(ω)
(4)
where {xi ,yi }i ∈[n] denotes the training data-set, f (xi ) = ωxi , and
ω is the parameter. L denotes the loss function, typical choices are
summarize in Table 1. R is some regularization function such as
Lp norm regularization. Now we describe a method to train the
above models based on our framework.
Suppose we use the gradient-based method to optimize Eq. (4),
the update rule for ω is as follows:
ωk+1 = ωk − η∇f (ωk ) (5)
where η is the learning rate and ∇f (ωk ) denotes the gradient of f
with respect to ωk . We can derive the explicit form of ∇f (ωk ) for
linear models:
∇f (ω) =
n∑
i=1
yi∇L × xi + ∇R (6)
Where ∇L and ∇R denote the gradients of L and R respectively.
Since the core step of learning a linear model is Eq. (5), we need to
linearize it for training under homomorphic encryption. By simple
observation, the non-linearity mainly comes from ∇L, we follow
the method proposed by Han et al. [22] to linearize it. We derive
the polynomial approximation of the losses of Table 1 in Table 2.
As a example, we also plot the hinge loss and its polynomial ap-
proximation based on regression in Figure 2.
With the linearization, the update step in Eq. (5) can be reformu-
lated as:
ωk+1 = ωk − η∇ˆf (ωk ) (7)
Table 1: Loss Functions for Different Linear Models [18]
Loss Function L(y, f (x))
Binomial Deviance log(1 + exp(−y f (x)))
SVM Hinge Loss [1 − y f (x)]+
Huber Loss −4y f (x), y f (x) < −1;[1 − y f (x)]2+ otherwise
Table 2: Polynomial Approximation for the gradient of the
Losses in Table 1. 4-order polynomial approximation is used
so as to get a 3-order approximation of the gradient of the
losses.
Loss Function ∇ˆL(x)
Binomial Deviance 0.5 − 0.0843x + 0.0002x3
SVM Hinge Loss 0.5875 − 0.1005x + 0.0008x2 − 0.00039x3
Huber Loss 2 − 0.1311x + 0.00005x3
where:
∇ˆf (ω) =
n∑
i
yi ∇ˆL × xi + ∇R (8)
and ∇ˆL is denoted in Table 2, what’s more, we assume the regular-
ization function is smooth (polynomial) for simplicity here, but we
can apply the same procedure to linearize ∇R as ∇L if necessary.
Now the update step only consists of addition and multiplication,
we can define a computational circuit which can be evaluated by
the HEAAN framework. The base learning algorithm used by every
worker is shown in Algorithm 1. A key innovation here is that we
avoid the use of bootstrap operation, instead we send the encrypted
parameter π (ω) back to the parameter server for refreshing when-
ever the noise encoded in it goes beyond a threshold. Empirically,
Figure 2: Hinge loss and its polynomial approximation
based on linear regression. The blue curve is the hinge loss
and the orange curve is its approximation.
Algorithm 1 Training Algorithm for Worker
1: Input: Learning rate η, public key pk , number of iterations l
to update the local weights, number of training iterations K ;
2: Output: Converged encrypted paramter π (ωK );
3: Initialization Phase:
4: Receive data from the parameter server, i.e. encrypted data-set
{π (xi ),π (yi )}i ∈[N ], public key pk and initial encrypted param-
eter π (ω0);
5: Training Phase:
6: for k = 1 to K do
7: update π (ω) by evaluating Eq. (8) homomorphically with pk ;
8: if k % l = 0 then
9: send π (ω) to the parameter server and wait until the pa-
rameter server sends back the updated weights;
10: end if
11: end for
we simply refresh π (ω) every l iterations as shown in Line 8 - 10
of Algorithm 1. Note this is critical in improving the performance
of the framework and we will show later in the experimental re-
sults section that this leads to more than 10× training speed boost
compared to the central version in Han et al. [22]. What’s more,
we pack multiple training samples into one ciphertext using the
pack technique in [22] to make use of the parallel capability of the
HEAAN framework. As for the parameter server, it performs the
function of combining the results from each worker and refreshing
corrupted parameters on the request of the worker, its procedure is
summarized in Algorithm 2.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the experimental results. To show the
effectiveness of our framework, we compare with the centralized
HE learning framework [22], and make ablation studies of the
key factors that influence the performance of our framework. In
the figure, we use ‘Plain’ to represent results without encryption;
Algorithm 2 Training Algorithm for Parameter Server
1: Input: Training set {xi ,yi }i ∈[N ], initial parameter ω0;
2: Output: Converged parameter ωK ;
3: Initialization Phase:
4: Generate public and secret keys, i.e. pk and sk , encrypt training
set {xi ,yi }i ∈[N ] and initial parameter ω0 with sk ;
5: Send the encrypted data-set {π (xi ),π (yi )}i ∈[N ], public key pk
and initial encrypted parameter π (ω0) to each worker;
6: Training Phase:
7: while the workers are running do
8: if receive request from workers then
9: Decrypt the encrypted parameter π (ω)param received
from the worker to get ωparam ;
10: Update its own ω with ωparam ;
11: Encrypt ω and send back to the worker;
12: end if
13: end while
use ‘Centralized’ to show the experimental results based on the
centralized learning framework.
More specifically, in section 5.1, we test under the distributed
learning setting, where we train different linear models on a sim-
plified MNIST data-set and a Financial Data-set [22], and also do
various ablation studies to study the influence of different factors
(hyper-parameters) to the performance of our framework. In sec-
tion 5.2, we test on a federated learning data-set called FEMNIST [7]
to show that our framework is also effective under the federated
learning scenario.
The experiments are conducted over an Intel Xeon E5-2683
v4 @ 2.10GHz server with 64 cores. We use OpenMPI [21] library to
simulate the communication between workers and the parameter
server. OpenMPI is an open source Message Passing Interface(MPI)
library widely used in high performance computing. What’s more,
we use a C++ implementation of HEAAN 1 to perform HE related
computations, such as homomorphic addition and multiplication.
5.1 Distributed Learning
In this subsection, we test our framework under distributed learning
settings. More specifically, we learn different linear models over a
simplified MNIST data-set and a Financial data-set. The data-set
construction process is as follows: we extract the digit 3 and 8 from
MNIST data-set to construct a data-set with 11982 training samples
and 1984 validation samples. Then we randomly split the training
set to construct the training set and the test set (the test set is kept
by the parameter server for evaluation). We also sub-sample the
digit images to 14×14. As for the financial data-set, we make use of
the public subset of the original data-set mentioned in [22] which
includes the credit information of 30000 individuals and 24 features
for each individual. We split the data-set to a training set of 27000
samples and a validation set of 3000 samples, and then randomly
split the training set further to construct data-set for each worker.
Now we present some experimental results. In Figure 3, we
plot results of the validation accuracy with respect to the training
time (log scale) when we train a logistic regression model over
1https://github.com/snucrypto/HEAAN
the MNIST data-set. As shown in the figure, both our distributed
learning algorithm and the centralized learning algorithm reach
the accuracy of around 96.5% which is the same as the plain accu-
racy, however, when comparing the training time, our framework
converges much faster than the centralized version. The central-
ized framework consumes around 4000-5000s to converge, while
our framework typically needs around 300-400s. We have carefully
tuned the centralized framework to reach the best time perfor-
mance, more specifically, we perform bootstrap every 3 iterations
for the centralized framework to reach the best comprise between
the magnitude of the ciphertext and the frequency of bootstrap. As
for our framework, we varies the frequency that workers refresh
their parameters. Apparently, the more frequent the worker re-
freshes its parameter, the higher communication overhead it leads
to, however, the variant that refreshes the parameter every iter-
ation surpasses all the other variants, although with the largest
communication overhead. This actually shows that communication
cost is negligible even compared to the cost of basic homomorphic
operations, let alone the more expensive bootstrap operation.
Figure 3: Validation accuracy with respect to the training
time (log scale) of a logistic regression model trained on
the simplified MNIST data-set. ‘Distributed-k’ means work-
ers refresh the parameters every k iterations for our frame-
work.
We now analyze our framework in more details. The accelera-
tion actually comes from two parts. Firstly, our framework saves a
great deal of the computational time by not performing the super
expensive bootstrap operation. Furthermore, an indirect effect of
eliminating the bootstrap operation is the smaller magnitude of the
ciphertext modulus. This is because the magnitude of the ciphertext
modulus is positively correlated with the depth of the computa-
tional circuit, while bootstrap operation takes up a significant part
of the circuit depth. Naturally, we can use smaller ciphertext modu-
lus when the computational circuit becomes shallower. Actually,
the computational time for other basic homomorphic operations
also decreases when we are able to use a smaller ciphertext modulus.
These all benefit the training speed of our framework. To illustrate
more about the effect of the ciphertext modulus, we train a variant
where we only eliminate bootstrap operation but keep the magni-
tude of the ciphertext modulus the same. The results are shown in
Figure 4. As we can see, simply eliminating the bootstrap operation
can save around half of the computational time, which is still at the
order of 103s, however, if we also make use of the saved ciphertext
modulus, the training time can be further decreased to the order
102s. To sum up, our framework avoids the expensive bootstrap
operation and also decrease the complexity of other basic opera-
tions by reducing the ciphertext modulus. Though with the cost
of communication, this is negligible as shown by the experimental
results.
Figure 4: Validation accuracy with respect to training time
(log scale) of a logistic regression model trained on the sim-
plified MNIST data-set. ‘Distributed’ is the results of our
framework, while ‘Distributed-var’means the variant of our
framework where the magnitude of ciphertext modulus is
kept the same.
To illustrate the robustness of our framework, we train different
linear models on the MNIST data-set with the polynomial approxi-
mation computed in Table 2. The best validation accuracy and the
corresponding training time for each model is shown in Table 3.
The accuracy and training time is roughly the same for each loss,
which shows the robustness of our framework. Next, we vary the
hyper-parameters to test their effect to the learning process. The
results are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The hyper-parameters
of the experiments related to the centralized framework is kept
the same as previous experiments. For the experiments in Figure 5,
we fix batch-size at 64 and vary the learning rate. While for the
experiments in Figure 6, we fix the learning rate at 1 and change
the batch-size. As shown by the experimental results, learning rate
1 and batch-size 128 is a reasonable choice with both fast and stable
convergence. What’s more, we also compare the influence of the
number of workers, the results are shown in Figure 7. We can see
that more workers lead to higher communication overhead and
slightly longer training time.
We also test our framework on a bigger and more realistic data-
set, i.e. the financial data-set as mentioned before. We compare the
validation accuracy and training time of our framework with that of
the centralized framework and show the results in the Table 4. Note
that for this bigger and more complicated data-set, our model can
achieve roughly the same accuracy (even slightly better) with the
centralized model while still remaining running 10× times faster.
Figure 5: Validation accuracy with respect to the training
time (log scale) of a logistic regression model trained on
MNIST data-set. ‘Distributed-k’ means the learning rate
used by our framework is k.
Figure 6: Validation accuracy with respect to the training
time (log scale) of a logistic regression model trained on
MNIST data-set. ‘Distributed-k’ means that the batch size
used by our framework is k.
Table 3: Validation Accuracy and Training Time for Differ-
ent Linear Models trained on MNIST data-set
Loss Function Accuracy Time(s)
Binomial Deviance 96.52 323.44
SVM Hinge Loss 96.42 333.74
Huber 96.57 333.65
5.2 Federated Learning
In this subsection, we test our framework under the federated
learning setting. The concept of Federated learning [27, 28, 35] is
proposed for learning over data-sets that are distributed across mul-
tiple devices and the distribution of which may be heterogeneous.
Security and privacy of the user data is a great challenge in Fed-
erated Learning, which is a great match of our fast HE-based data
Figure 7: Validation accuracy with respect to training time
(log scale) of a logistic regression model trained on MNIST
data-set. ‘Distributed-worker-k’ represents the number of
workers used is k.
Table 4: Validation Accuracy and Training Time of Logistic
Regression Model over Financial Data-set
Framework Accuracy Time(s)
Distributed 79.62 303.8
Centralized 79.42 4059.68
Plain 79.42 -
mining framework. In this paper, we simulate the federated learn-
ing scenario with the FEMNIST data-set [7]. FEMNIST is generated
from the MNIST data-set by partitioning the data-set according to
the writer of each character. Since each writer has a special writing
style, the underlying distribution of the characters written by them
are different and therefore, FEMNIST is a good choice to simulate
the federated learning situation. More specifically, we construct the
data-set as follows: we randomly select 50 writers for each worker
and construct a data-set with the characters they write. In Figure 8,
we show two samples of the digits written by two different writers.
The digit 8 in the left figure is slimmer and orients to the right,
while the digit in the right is fatter and orients to the left. As for the
data-set used by the centralized learning framework, we combine
all of the users’ characters together to form a data-set.
Figure 8: Two samples of digits from FEMNIST dataset.
Table 5: Validation Accuracy and Training Time for Differ-
ent Linear Models trained on FEMNIST data-set
Loss Function Accuracy Time(s)
Binomial Deviance 94.64 327.09
SVM Hinge Loss 93.66 337.63
Huber Loss 94.91 327.01
As in the distributed learning case, we learn different models over
FEMNIST data-set and the accuracy and training time is shown in
Table 5. Their performance is roughly the same and the SVM model
gets a slightly worse accuracy. What’s more, we vary the learning
rate and batch-size to show the robustness of our framework. The
results are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The results show that
our framework achieves the same training speed boost i.e. 10×
times under federated learning settings.
Figure 9: Validation accuracy with respect to training time
(log scale) of a logistic regression model trained on FEM-
NIST data-set. ‘Distributed-k’ means the workers use learn-
ing rate k. We use batch-size 64 in this experiment.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a distributed learning framework to dras-
tically improve the training speed of HE-based data mining al-
gorithms. For example, we train a logistic regression model over
a data-set with 10 thousand records within 5 minutes, while the
centralized framework needs almost 2 hours. This performance
boost is achieved by eliminating the bootstrap operation with the
cost of communication between the workers and the parameter
server. What’s more, our framework is agnostic with different HE
frameworks, distributed learning frameworks or specific models.
We leave it as a future work to test our framework in larger scale,
however, we note that the computational time of the basic arith-
metic operation (especially the ciphertext multiplication) is still a
bottleneck which is several orders slower than the plain operation.
With the development of HE, the performance of our framework
can be improved further. Finally, the model maintains privacy since
it performs evaluation in the encryption field, however, the model
may still contain some private information if we decrypt it, one
Figure 10: Validation accuracy with respect to training time
(log scale) of a logistic regressionmodel trained on FEMNIST
data-set. ‘Distributed-k’ means the workers use batch-size k,
we use learning rate 1 in this experiment.
possible remedy is to combine our framework with other privacy
preserving techniques like differential privacy.
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